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DOMESTIC RELATIONS*
Peter N. Swisher**
I. 1986 LEGISLATION
A. Virginia Premarital Agreement Act
The Virginia Premarital Agreement Act" was reenacted during
the 1986 legislative session of the Virginia General Assembly and
became law effective July 1, 1986.2
B. Equitable Distribution Statutory Modifications
The 1986 General Assembly made three important changes in
the Virginia equitable distribution statute.' First, the duty of the
court in determining legal title, ownership, and value of property is
now further clarified to include "all property,4 real and personal,
tangible or intangible."5 Under the previous statute, the duty of
the court was to determine legal title, ownership, and value "of all
real and personal property" upon the request of either party.
Second, there is a new definition of marital property. Under the
previous statute, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage, but before the filing of a bill of complaint stating a
ground for divorce, was presumed to be marital property in the
absence of satisfactory evidence that it was separate property.6
* Child custody, child support, juvenile delinquency, paternity, and abused and neglected
children will all be addressed in the article on Legal Issues Involving Children, infra at 903.
** Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1966,
Amherst College; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; J.D., 1973, University of California, Has-
tings College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of John B.
Simoni, Jr., T.C. Williams School of Law, Class of 1987.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Cur. Supp. 1986).
2. For an analysis of the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act, see Swisher & Bucur, Do-
mestic Relations, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 731, 731-36 (1985).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
4. Id. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
5. Id. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986). Arguably, this duty could now include intangible
property such as patents and copyrights, professional goodwill, and professional degrees or
licenses. See, e.g., Gold v. Gold, Chancery No. 631-1983 (Cir. Ct. Roanoke County, Nov. 10,
1983), reprinted in 1 Va. Cir. 390 (1985) (professional goodwill, but not a professional de-
gree, included as marital property).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The new amendment now defines marital property as all property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage "and before the last
separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one
of the parties intends that the separation be permanent."'
The third amendment to the statute deals with the right of the
court to retain jurisdiction over the parties' property interests
upon the granting of a divorce. The court, on the motion of both
parties, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to ad-
judicate the remedy provided by this section "when the court de-
termines that such action is clearly necessary because of the com-
plexities of the parties' property interests, and all decrees
heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated."8 This
amendment was presumably the result of justifiable concern result-
ing from the Parra v. Parra9 and Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy0
cases, which determined whether a Virginia circuit court could re-
serve jurisdiction to hear equitable distribution matters subse-
quent to rendering a divorce decree.1 The statutory amendment,
which also expressly validates prior decrees, has undoubtedly been
greeted with a collective sigh of relief from many Virginia family
law practitioners and their professional malpractice insurers. There
is a caveat, however. This new amendment still requires the mo-
tion of both parties in order for the court to retain jurisdiction over
the parties' property interests.
C. Statutory Spousal and Child Support Modifications
The relevant factors for determining child support upon divorce
under Virginia Code ("Code") section 20-107.212 now include the
tax consequences to the parties."3 Additionally, section 20-108.11'
7. Id. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Cur. Supp. 1986).
8. Id. § 20-107.3(A).
9. 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985).
10. 1 Va. App. 136, 336 S.E.2d 166 (1985).
11. The Parra court, recognizing the split of authority in other jurisdictions regarding this
question, held that a Virginia circuit court could indeed retain jurisdiction to make an equi-
table distribution award under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 twenty-one days after the entry of
a divorce decree when a specific reservation of jurisdiction was contained in the decree. This
decision, however, was strongly objected to in a dissenting opinion by Judge Baker. 1 Va.
App. 118, 130, 336 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1985) (Baker, C.J., dissenting). The statutory amend-
ment apparently supports the Parra majority decision. See also infra notes 33-37 and ac-
companying text.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
13. Id. § 20-107.2(2)(h).
14. Id. § 20-108.1.
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has been adopted to guide the court in the determination of child
and spousal support. This section provides as follows:
In any proceeding on the issue of determining child or spousal sup-
port, the court shall consider all evidence presented relevant to any
issues joined in the proceeding. The court's decision shall be ren-
dered based upon the evidence relevant to each individual case. Any
use of a mathematical formula in the computation of such support
shall be restricted to its use as a general guideline only.15
This statute may have been adopted in anticipation of a recom-
mendation by the Virginia Governor's Commission on Child Sup-
port to apply an "Income Shares Formula" to monthly basic child
support obligations, as advocated by Dr. Robert G. Williams,16 or
another like mathematical formula. The statute also may have an
effect on certain county and city courts in Virginia which have pre-
viously applied mathematical tables and formulas in determining
pendente lite and other child and spousal support obligations.
Other statutory changes involving child and spousal support ju-
risdiction include: (1) the juvenile and domestic relations court ju-
risdiction regarding Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act appeals;17 (2) the juvenile and domestic relations
court jurisdiction regarding child support appeals; 8 (3) the juve-
nile and domestic relations court jurisdiction concerning a parent's
duty to support a child;"9 and (4) sanctions a juvenile and domes-
tic relations court may impose on an employer for failure to com-
ply with a court-ordered child support payroll deduction. 0
15. Id.
16. An excerpt of the Virginia Governor's Commission on Child Support recommending
the adoption of the "Income Shares Formula" for determining monthly child support obli-
gations appears in Appendix A following this article.This formula is already familiar to
many Virginia circuit court and juvenile and domestic relations court judges. Under VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Cum. Supp. 1986), this formula could still arguably be utilized as a
general "ball park" guideline, in addition to other relevant evidence in each individual case.
17. Id. § 16.1-296.
18. Id. § 63.1-267.1.
19. Id. § 16.1-241.
20. Id. § 16.1-279. For further statutory amendments on the enforcement of child and
spousal support through payroll deductions, see Id. §§ 20-60.3 -60.5 -79.1, and §§ 63.1-53, -
250 to -250.3, -271, -287, and § 63.1-250.4.
1986] 813
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D. Other Procedural Changes
Formerly, Code section 8.01-293(2) provided that no person
eighteen years of age or older would be eligible to serve process in
a divorce or annulment unless authorized to do so by the court.
The new statutory amendment now allows any person eighteen
years of age or older who is not a party to the controversy to serve
process in any divorce or annulment action.2'
Section 20-121.02 formerly provided that attorneys could orally
amend a divorce based on cruelty or desertion grounds under sec-
tion 20-91(6) to become a divorce based on separation grounds
under section 20-91(9) without filing an amended bill of complaint
or cross-bill. The amendment to section 20-121.02 now allows adul-
tery, sodomy, buggery, and conviction of a felony as additional
grounds for this oral amendment.22
E. Pending Legislation and Other Statutory Matters
Various bills of interest to the Virginia family law practitioner
were carried over to the 1987 legislative session.
House Bill 56723 seeks to amend Code section 20-107.2 to pro-
vide for joint legal custody of minor children on divorce if it is in
the best interests of the child or children. Additionally, House
Joint Resolution 31 was passed by the 1986 legislature to establish
a joint House and Senate subcommittee to study the Model Joint
Custody Act.24
Senate Bill 10825 seeks to protect the best interests of the child
or children in a contested child custody action by allowing the
court, in its discretion, to appoint a separate guardian ad litem to
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-293(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
22. Id. § 20-121.02.
23. H. 567 (1986). This bill seeks to reenact and amend VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107.2 (Rep.
Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1986), providing for joint legal custody of children. This bill was
offered January 21, 1986, and carried over to the 1987 legislative session.
24. H.R.J. Res. 31, 1986 Va. Acts 1929 (establishes a joint subcommittee of the House and
Senate Courts of Justice Committees to study the Model Joint Custody Act). Thirty-three
states presently have some form of joint custody law. See, e.g., Freed & Walker, Family Law
in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAm. L.Q. 331, 402 (1986).
25. S. 108 (1986). This bill seeks to reenact and amend VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.2, -134
(Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1986) and add § 16.1-244.1 (relating to the discretionary
appointment of a guardian ad litem in child custody controversies). The bill was carried
over to the 1987 legislative session.
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represent such child or children. Also, Senate Bill 1426 seeks to en-
act the Uniform Parentage Act into law in Virginia and will be
debated in the 1987 legislative session.
Senate Bill 1127 failed to pass in the House. The purpose of this
bill was to prohibit any absolute statutory bar to spousal support
unless the needy spouse was guilty of adultery, sodomy or bug-
gery.2 s Senate Bill 11 was thus a wise attempt to make marital
fault one of many factors in determining alimony or spousal sup-
port rather than acting as an absolute bar to alimony or spousal
support."' A similar bill, treating all categories of marital fault only
as factors in determining spousal support rather than acting as an
absolute bar, should be enacted in a subsequent legislative
session.30
Finally, the family law practitioner should be aware of new legis-
lation in the criminal law area regarding spousal abuses" and mari-
tal sexual assualt3
26. S. 14 (1986).
27. S. 11 (1986). This bill seeks to amend VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1986) to
prohibit an absolute bar of spousal support to a needy spouse unless he or she was guilty of
adultery, sodomy or buggery under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(1) (Cure. Supp. 1986).
28. Virginia is currently one of only eight states in which marital misconduct constitutes a
bar to spousal support or alimony. See Freed & Walker, supra note 24, at 368-69.
29. As one factor in determining spousal support under § 20-107.1(8)(a), the bill provided
for the consideration of "[t]he circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolu-
tion of the marriage, specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of §
20-91(1), (3) or (6) or § 20-95." This provision was later amended to further provide that
"no permanent maintenance and support shall be awarded from a spouse if there exists in
such spouse's favor a ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-91(1) [adultery, sod-
omy or buggery]."
30. In 30 states, marital fault is no longer considered in awarding alimony or spousal
support. In another 12 states, marital fault is only one of many factors in determining ali-
mony or spousal support. See, e.g., Freed & Walker, supra note 22, at 367-70. Various
authors have demonstrated that there is little correlation between societal norms and tra-
ditional "fault" grounds that would justify retaining such absolute bars. See, e.g., M. RHEIN-
STEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAw (1972).
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (dealing with penalties for subse-
quent spousal abuse offenses).
32. For new statutes dealing with preliminary hearings, judgment, and penalties regarding
marital sexual assault, see id. §§ 18.2-67.2:1, 19.2-218.1, -218.2. For amendments dealing
with preliminary hearings, judgment, and penalties regarding marital sexual assault, see id.
§§ 18.2-61, -67.1, -67.2.
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II. JUDICIAL CASES
A. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property on Divorce
1. Jurisdiction over Marital Property Matters Subsequent to
Rendering a Divorce Decree
In Parra v. Parra,33 the Virginia appellate court upheld a circuit
court's right to retain jurisdiction to hear equitable distribution
matters subsequent to rendering a divorce decree. The Parra court,
however, reversed the circuit court's equitable distribution award,
holding that this award was not inconsistent with the parties'
property settlement agreement in the absence of any proof that the
agreement was invalid.3 4 However, in Shaughnessy v. Shaugh-
nessy,35 the court held that when adequate evidence was intro-
duced at trial to make a requested determination of equitable dis-
tribution at that time, the circuit court abused its authority by
reserving a determination of equitable distribution until after the
divorce decree. 6
The justifiable concern of Virginia family law practitioners over
the proper interpretation of the Parra and Shaughnessy decisions
has largely been settled by a subsequent legislative amendment to
Virginia's equitable distribution statute.1
2. Determining Equitable Property Division Upon Divorce
In the case of Papuchis v. Papuchis,8 the wife who received an
equitable distribution award of less than fifty percent of the value
of the parties' marital property upon divorce argued that Virginia
courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption favoring equal divi-
sion of marital property. However, the Virginia appellate court
rejected the wife's argument and held that the applicable statute40
33. 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985).
34. Id. at 120, 336 S.E.2d at 158.
35. 1 Va. App. 136, 336 S.E.2d 166 (1985).
36. Id. at 140, 336 S.E.2d at 169.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986); see also supra notes 8-11 and accom-
panying text.
38. 2 Va. App. 130, 341 S.E.2d 829 (1986).
39. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. at 131-32, 341 S.E.2d at 830. Although the courts in equitable
distribution states such as Oregon, Wisconsin, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee
"use this presumption where statutory language directs it, the courts in most other equita-
ble distribution states do not use this presumption." Id.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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requires the trial court to determine the amount of the award and
the method of its payment after considering eleven specific factors.
The court stated that this approach followed the recommendation
of a legislative subcommittee which expressly rejected "any pre-
sumption in favor of an equal distribution of marital property."'"
The distinction between separate and marital property was ana-
lyzed in Rexrode v. Rexrode,42 where the appellate court held that
if certain funds were acquired prior to the marriage but contribu-
tions were made into the funds during the marriage, the party
claiming these funds as separate property must overcome the pre-
sumption that they are marital property.43 The husband failed to
overcome this presumption, thus the circuit court erred in charac-
terizing the joint savings account in question as separate property.
The court also emphasized that if a divorce court determines that
an equitable property award is appropriate, then all of the provi-
sions of Virginia Code section 20-107.3 must be followed.44
Pension plans and retirement benefits as marital property were
discussed in Sawyer v. Sawyer45 and McGinnis v. McGinnis.46 In
Sawyer, a military pension was acquired during the marriage. The
court interpreted section 20-107.3 and concluded that the legisla-
ture intended "all pensions, including military pensions, to be per-
sonal property and subject to equitable distribution. ' 47 The Mc-
Ginnis case held that under section 20-107.3 the trial court erred
in alloting to the wife personal property that was titled in the hus-
band's name.48 Since marital property provisions were to be recon-
sidered on remand, the trial court also was instructed to reexamine
spousal support "in the light of whatever new or different consider-
ations flow from the additional proceedings." 49
In the case of Venable v. Venable,50 the appellate court held
that the circuit court's order to convey title in jointly owned
41. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. at 132, 341 S.E.2d at 830-31 (citing Report of the Joint Sub-
committee Studying Section 20-107 of the Code of Virginia to the Governor and the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia, H. Doc. No. 21, at 8 (1982)).
42. 1 Va. App. 385, 339 S.E.2d 544 (1986).
43. Id. at 394, 339 S.E.2d at 548-49.
44. Id. at 394, 339 S.E.2d at 550.
45. 1 Va. App. 75, 335 S.E.2d 277 (1985).
46. 1 Va. App. 272, 338 S.E.2d 159 (1985).
47. Sawyer, 1 Va. App. at 78, 335 S.E.2d at 280.
48. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. at 276, 338 S.E.2d at 161.
49. Id. at 277, 338 S.E.2d at 161.
50. 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986).
1986]
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properties was not authorized under section 20-107.3 when certain
statutory requirements had not been met.51
B. Spousal Support Decisions
Again, in the case of Venable v. Venable,52 the wife was seeking
to modify a pendente lite support decree. The wife was allowed to
present evidence justifying this modification even though the hus-
band's attorney became ill and the husband appeared at the hear-
ing without counsel and requested a continuance. The wife had
traveled at her cost and inconvenience from Nashville, Tennessee
for the hearing. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it received the wife's evidence but also
continued the case in order to permit the husband's counsel to
cross-examine the wife at a later date. 3
In Boyd v. Boyd,54 the wife filed a cross-bill for divorce which
included a general prayer "for such other and further relief as to
equity may seem meet and the nature of her case may require,"
but she did not specifically request spousal support.55 The appel-
late court held that this general request was not sufficient to plead
or claim any right to spousal support.56 In D'Auria v. D'Auria,57
the court reaffirmed the Virginia rule that it is reversible error for
a court to fail to make a reservation of spousal support when re-
quested to do so by a party. In the absence of any such request,
however, the court is under no obligation to insert reservation of
spousal support language in the decree sua sponte.5 Thus, the si-
lence in the final divorce decree as to spousal support has the ef-
fect of foreclosing a spouse from petitioning the court under sec-
51. The court stated that
under the statute's mandate [§ 20-107.3] the court must first identify the marital
property and determine its value. Upon consideration of the factors enumerated in
Code § 20-107.3(E), the court may grant a monetary award to one party. Jointly
owned marital property may be partitioned. Code § 20-107.3(C). Once a monetary
award has been made, the party against whom it was made may satisfy the award by
conveyance of property with the court's approval. Code § 20-107.3(D).
Id. at 185, 342 S.E.2d at 650-51.
52. 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986).
53. Id. at 182, 342 S.E.2d at 648-49. "Under these circumstances, there was no abridge-
ment of Mr. Venable's due process rights." Id.
54. 2 Va. App. 16, 340 S.E.2d 578 (1986).
55. Id. at 18, 340 S.E.2d at 579.
56. Id. at 19, 340 S.E.2d at 580-81.
57. 1 Va. App. 455, 340 S.E.2d 164 (1986).
58. Id. at 462, 340 S.E.2d at 168.
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tion 20-109 for a future support award in light of changed
circumstances.59
An alleged change of circumstances meriting a reduction or elim-
ination of spousal support was argued by the payor husband in
Floyd v. Floyd,60 where the husband testified that the financial
condition of his business was "deteriorating," and causing him
"great difficulty in making spousal support payments." 61 However,
there was also testimony that the husband's business had remained
stable and, although his salary had decreased, the husband had
made cash withdrawals from the company which were character-
ized as loans rather than as salary.2 The Floyd court held that the
husband had not proven a change of circumstances by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and that the trial court's findings "would
not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evi-
dence to support them. "63
Spousal support related to marital fault was analyzed by the ap-
pellate court in Dukelow v. Dukelow64 and Wallace v. Wallace. 5
In Dukelow, the payor husband argued on appeal that the evidence
was sufficient to find the wife guilty of desertion and therefore the
trial court had erred in awarding her any spousal support, much
less an increase in spousal support. However, the appellate court
affirmed the spousal support increase since the husband had not
filed any exceptions to the Commissioner's report. A party "may
not raise a question for the first time on appeal, except when there
is error appearing on the face of the report. 66
59. Id.
60. 1 Va. App. 42, 333 S.E.2d 364 (1985).
61. Id. at 44, 333 S.E.2d at 365.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 45, 333 S.E.2d at 366.
64. 2 Va. App. 21, 341 S.E.2d 208 (1986).
65. 1 Va. App. 183, 336 S.E.2d 27 (1985).
66. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. at 24, 341 S.E.2d at 209-10 (citing Watson v. Brunner, 128 Va.
600, 105 S.E. 97 (1920)). But see Zinkhan v. Zinkhan, 2 Va. App. 200, 342 S.E.2d 658 (1986)
(where desertion was proved by the husband, spousal support to the wife was barred). The
Zinkhan decision further held that where dual grounds for divorce exist, separation and
desertion, the trial judge is not required to grant a divorce under the one-year separation
statute. Id. at 210, 342 S.E.2d at 663. Thus, the trial court judge, by choosing a fault or "no
fault" divorce ground, can effectively determine whether or not spousal support will be
required.
In Clephas v. Clephas, 1 Va. App. 209, 336 S.E.2d 897 (1985), a September 12, 1984,
support arrearage order was held to be not appealable under VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05:4
(Cure. Supp. 1986). The September order was not modified by the court's October 3rd tele-
phone conference because a court "may only speak through its written orders." Similarly it
1986]
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In Wallace, the question raised was whether the wife was barred
from receiving spousal support when her husband alleged she had
committed adultery fifteen years after the parties separated and
where the evidence showed that the husband was, in fact, responsi-
ble for the termination of the marriage.6 7 The wife had refused to
answer any questions regarding her alleged adulterous conduct,
but the court held that this would not bar the husband's support
obligation:
The trial court did not err in denying Mr. Wallace's motion to re-
quire Mrs. Wallace and Rogers to answer the questions posed to
them regarding adultery. The record amply supports the court's
opinion that it was Mr. Wallace's own fault and misconduct that
caused the termination of the marriage. Assuming arguendo that her
answers would have been incriminatory, Mrs. Wallace, nonetheless,
could have asserted the doctrine of recrimination and prevented her
husband from obtaining a fault divorce. The questions posed were
simply immaterial. With neither party entitled to a fault divorce,
the obligation to support a spouse continues."'
It should be noted that the common thread in almost all of these
spousal support decisions is the appellate court's reaffirmation of
the trial court's broad discretion in ultimately determining any
spousal support award. That is to say, "in fixing spousal support a
trial court has broad discretion which should not be interfered
with by an appellate court unless it is clear that some injustice has
been done."69
Nevertheless, in determining any spousal support award, the
trial court still must have adequate jurisdiction. In the case of Ste-
phens v. Stephens,70 the former wife registered a Florida divorce
decree in Virginia pursuant to RURESA 1 and served the defend-
was not modified by an October 13th written order since it could only be modified under
Rule 1:1 within 21 days after entry.
67. Wallace, 1 Va. App. at 184, 336 S.E.2d at 27.
68. Id. at 187, 336 S.E.2d at 29 (citing Bwoker v. Bwoker, 218 Va. 12, 13, 235 S.E.2d 309,
310 (1977)).
69. Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 133, 341 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1986) (citing Oliver v.
Oliver, 202 Va. 268, 272, 117 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1960)); see also Sawyer v. Sawyer, 1 Va. App. 75,
81, 335 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1985) ("considering the needs of the wife, and the resources of the
husband, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion").
70. 229 Va. 212, 313 S.E.2d 484 (1985).
71. Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.12
to -88.30:6(a) (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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ant former husband who was residing in Tennessee. The court held
that this action was not sufficient to create in personam jurisdic-
tion over the former husband in Virginia in order to collect spousal
support arrearages.7 2
C. Divorce Grounds and Defenses
1. Adultery
In Venable v. Venable,"5 the husband contended that the wife
should be barred from obtaining a divorce because of her admis-
sion during the ore tenus hearing of an adulterous relationship
subsequent to the parties' separation. However, the husband did
not seek a divorce based upon the ground of adultery nor was there
any corroborating evidence independent of the wife's admission of
adultery. Therefore, the wife's adulterous conduct "had no bearing
upon [the husband's] cruelty which caused the dissolution of the
marriage. ' 4 Likewise, in Wallace v. Wallace, 5 the wife refused to
answer any questions regarding her alleged adulterous conduct fif-
teen years after the parties separated. Since the husband had been
responsible for the termination of the marriage, he was not re-
lieved of his support obligation to the wife. Finally, in Dodge v.
Dodge, 7 the husband asserted that the wife had presented insuffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's finding of adultery. The
appellate court stated that in order to establish a charge of adul-
tery, the evidence must be clear, positive, and convincing, and that
a divorce may not be awarded on the uncorroborated testimony of
the parties."8 Nevertheless, a review of the transcript "disclose[d]
that husband made statements to wife and to an independent wit-
ness from which it can be inferred that husband admitted to hav-
ing sexual intercourse with [another]. '79
72. Stephens, 229 ,Va. at 212, 313 S.E.2d at 484.
73. 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986).
74. Id. at 184, 342 S.E.2d at 650.
75. 2 Va. App. 183, 336 S.E.2d 27 (1985).
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. 2 Va. App. 238, 343 S.E.2d 363 (1986).
78. Id. at 242, 343 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Painter v. Painter, 215 Va. 418, 420, 211 S.E.2d
37, 38 (1975)).
79. Id. at 244, 343 S.E.2d at 366 (oral statement by the husband to his wife and to a
former co-worker that "Mrs. Nobles was pregnant, . . . it was his baby," and evidence of
husband and Mrs. Nobles sharing a home). The Dodge court stated that "the main object of
the statute requiring corroboration is to prevent collusion. Where it is apparent that
there is no collusion, the corroboration needs to be only slight." Id. at 245, 343 S.E.2d at 367
(citing Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659, 661-62, 70 S.E.2d 339, 340-41 (1952)).
1986]
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2. Cruelty and Desertion
In Venable v. Venable,80 a charge of cruelty was sufficiently sup-
ported and corroborated by: (1) the wife's testimony; (2) the wife's
mother's corroboration of bruises and bite marks on the wife's
body and face; and (3) the fact that the husband had a violent
temper."'
In Collier v. Collier,2 the physical act of the husband moving
from the marital home, coupled with a note he left his wife of his
clear intent to leave (which was corroborated by the wife's sister),
justified an absolute divorce to the wife on the ground of deser-
tion.83 Likewise, in Rexrode v. Rexrode,84 the court found the wife
was guilty of desertion because she did not have sufficient legal
justification for leaving the marital home and could not sufficiently
prove the husband's alleged cruelty and constructive desertion.8 5
In the case of Brawand v. Brawand,86 however, the court held
that although the husband's conduct did not constitute cruelty
amounting to constructive desertion, that fact, standing alone,
would not necessarily establish that the wife was without legal jus-
tification in leaving the marital abode. Thus, the wife will not be
guilty of desertion if she leaves the marital abode without in-
tending to desert her husband, reasonably believing that her health
or well-being is endangered, even though she is unable to prove
cruelty or constructive desertion on the part of the husband.8 7
80. 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986).
81. Id. at 186, 342 S.E.2d at 650. The court held that where "it is apparent that there is
no collusion, as in this case, the corroboration needs to be only slight." Id. at 184, 342 S.E.2d
at 650 (citing Graves, 193 Va. at 662, 70 S.E.2d at 340).
82. 2 Va. App. 125, 341 S.E.2d 827 (1986).
83. Id. at 128, 341 S.E.2d at 828.
84. 1 Va. App. 385, 339 S.E.2d 544 (1986).
85. Id. at 388-90, 339 S.E.2d at 546-47; see also Zinkhan v. Zinkhan, 2 Va. App. 200, 342
S.E.2d 658 (1986). In Zinkhan, the court stated:
To constitute a defense to the husband's prima facie showing of desertion, the wife
must prove misconduct on the part of the husband sufficient in scope to constitute a
ground of divorce in her favor against the husband. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that one spouse is not justified in leaving the other unless the conduct of
the wrongdoer could be made the foundation of judicial proceeding for divorce. Noth-
ing short of such conduct will justify a willful separation or a continuance of it.
Id. at 205, 342 S.E.2d at 661; see also D'Auria v. D'Auria, 1 Va. App. 455, 340 S.E.2d 164
(1986) (on corroborating evidence from the husband and from the wife's physician, the trial
court properly found that the wife had the intent to desert the marriage without any legal
justification for leaving the marital home).
86. 1 Va. App. 305, 338 S.E.2d 651 (1986).
87. Id. at 310, 338 S.E.2d at 653.
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3. Living Separate and Apart
In the circuit court case of Doggett v. Doggett,88 the question
presented was whether the wife was entitled to a divorce on the
ground of having lived separate and apart without cohabitation or
interruption for one year pursuant to Code section 20-91(9)(a).89
The parties' depositions indicated that the parties resided at the
same address, and supplemental depositions revealed that the par-
ties had lived in the same house since September, 1981. However,
the parties worked different hours of the day, did not sleep in the
same room, and did not "spend any time together as husband and
wife." The parties "definitely had not reconciled or spent the night
together" during this time period and, according to the plaintiff,
"neither party had moved out because of financial hardship."90
Based upon this fact situation, and citing Hooker v. Hooker91 and
Chandler v. Chandler92 for support, Judge Hughes granted the di-
vorce by finding that the parties had lived "separate and apart" for
one year although they resided under the same roof 9 3
D. Separation Agreements Interpreted
In Barnes v. Barnes,94 the husband sought to rescind a separa-
tion agreement based upon the wife's alleged marital infidelity
which the wife had failed to disclose to him prior to signing the
agreement. The trial court allowed the husband to rescind the sep-
aration agreement but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The
court held that when the husband and wife separated and em-
ployed attorneys to negotiate a property settlement agreement,
they became adversaries dealing at arm's length and their former
88. 5 Va. Cir. 349 (Richmond 1986).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
90. Doggett, 5 Va. Cir. at 349-50.
91. 215 Va. 415, 211 S.E.2d 34 (1975).
92. 132 Va. 418, 112 S.E. 856 (1922).
93. Doggett, 5 Va. Cir. at 350. Judge Hughes stated that: "Abandonment-desertion-
[and, by analogy, living separate and apart] may be as complete under the same shelter as if
oceans rolled between." Id. (citing Graves v. Graves, 88 Miss. 671, 41 So. 384 (1906)); see
also Robertson v. Robertson, Case No. 77 C 331 (Cir. Ct. Henrico County, Nov. 3, 1977),
reprinted in 6 Va. Cir. - (1986) (people can live separate and apart though under the same
roof). But see Brinig, Living Separate and Apart in Virginia, 5 VA. FAm. L. NEws 25 (1984).
Professor Brinig contends that requiring parties seeking a "no-fault" divorce to live under
separate roofs "has two bases, one of which is substantive and the other evidential." Id.
94. 231 Va. 39, 340 S.E.2d 803 (1986).
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fiduciary or confidential relationship ended at that time 5
In Parrillo v. Parrillo,96 a court decree which modified a unitary
child and spousal support sum was allowed to increase the sum for
child support but could not abrogate, supplant, or modify the par-
ties' contractual agreement regarding spousal support.9 7
In Troyer v. Troyer,9 the husband sued his former wife and
others for specific performance or, alternatively, to reform a deed
which conveyed marital property to his former wife alone. How-
ever, in a deposition, the husband had stated under oath that he
gave his wife "everything." The court held that this was a suffi-
cient memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds regarding the
husband's conveyance to the wife of realty acquired during the
marriage.99
An ambiguous agreement in Thompson v. Thompson"0 provided
that the husband would "withdraw or refrain from legal action to
remove [the wife] from the house." The husband then brought a
suit to partition the marital domicile, but the wife argued that
"she could remain in the house for the rest of her life"''1° pursuant
to the agreement. Admitting parol evidence to resolve this ambigu-
ity, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision in
favor of the husband.10
2
Finally, in Tiffany v. Tiffany, 03 a former wife sought an order to
show cause why the former husband should not be held in con-
tempt for failing to pay an older son's college expenses. The college
expenses were to be paid by the husband pursuant to the terms of
a separation agreement which was incorporated in the divorce de-
cree. The agreement provided that "[the] [h]usband shall be enti-
tled to participate in the decision making process as to the college
to be attended."'01 4 The husband refused to pay for the college ex-
95. Id. at 41-42, 340 S.E.2d at 804-05.
96. 1 Va. App. 226, 336 S.E.2d 23 (1985).
97. Id. at 230, 336 S.E.2d at 26; see also Cass v. Lassiter, 2 Va. App. 273, 343 S.E.2d 470
(1986) (unitary award where divorce decree was inconsistent with the incorporated separa-
tion agreement provisions).
98. 231 Va. 90, 341 S.E.2d 182 (1986).
99. Id. at 91-93, 341 S.E.2d at 184-85.
100. 231 Va. 161, 162, 343 S.E.2d 53, 53 (1986).
101. Id. at 162-63, 343 S.E.2d at 54.
102. Id. at 163, 343 S.E.2d at 54.
103. 1 Va. App. 11, 332 S.E.2d 796 (1985).
104. Id. at 13-14, 332 S.E.2d at 795.
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penses because he objected to his son's choice of college.110 On re-
view, the appellate court stated that: (1) it was not bound by the
trial court's construction of the contract provisions at issue;10 6 (2)
in construing such contracts, ordinary words are to be given their
ordinary meanings; and (3) the "plain language of the agreement
does not require that [the former wife] or the son select a college
acceptable to [the former husband].' 07
E. Related Federal Decisions
In Doe v. Duling,0 8 two unmarried adults filed a suit challenging
the constitutionality of Virginia's fornication' 9 and cohabitation" 0
statutes. The district court held that: (1) the unmarried adults had
standing to bring the suit; (2) there was a sufficient threat of prose-
cution to render the case ripe for review; and (3) these statutes
violated the constitutional right to privacy that extends to an un-
married adult's decision to engage in private, nonprostitutional,
heterosexual activities."' However, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the lower court opinion," 2 holding that plaintiffs
failed to show even a remote chance that they are threatened with
prosecution under these provisions.... We therefore vacate the
judgment of the court below and remand with directions to dismiss
for want of a justiciable case or controversy. We express no view on
the merits of the constitutional questions addressed by the district
court.
1 13
In Stewart v. Hall, 4 a former client brought a legal malpractice
action against an attorney. The plaintiff alleged that the attorney
had negligently represented him in a child custody matter and had
intentionally concealed certain material facts with respect to the
105. The husband wanted his son to attend a Virginia college, but the son enrolled in the
University of Hartford, Connecticut. Id. at 14-15, 332 S.E.2d at 798-99.
106. Id. at 15, 332 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d
396, 398 (1984)).
107. Id. at 17, 332 S.E.2d at 800.
108. 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.Va. 1985), vacated, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
110. Id. § 18.2-345.
111. Duling, 603 F. Supp. at 964-69.
112. Duling, 782 F.2d at 1204.
113. Id.
114. 770 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1985).
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attorney's preparation of the child custody case.11 5 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals vacated the lower court decision against the
attorney because, under Virginia law, the court was convinced
"that the case was tried on the wrong theory of legal malpractice
and that it would be fundamental error to allow the judgment to
stand."116 Although the court stated that it "ordinarily will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal," in very limited
circumstances it would consider such an issue "if the error is
'plain' and if our refusal to consider such would result in the denial
of fundamental justice. "117
A unique issue was raised in the case of Head v. Head,"' where
the wife, in a December 1981 property settlement agreement, re-
leased any claim she might have had against her husband in ex-
change for $1,525,000. Four months after the husband had satisfied
his property settlement obligations, he sold all of his shares of
stock in a corporation for $45,000,000. The wife thereafter brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land alleging that the December 1981 property settlement agree-
ment constituted a fraudulently induced "sale" of her alleged in-
terest in the shares of stock in violation -of section 10(b) of the
Securities of Exchange Act of 1934; SEC Rule 10(b)(5); and section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.119 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's decision that the wife, by vir-
tue of the December 1981 property settlement agreement, was not
a "seller" of the shares of stock and therefore lacked standing to
sue.12 0 Although the court defined and interpreted marital prop-
erty according to the Maryland Marital Property Act,'2 ' it is worth
noting that Maryland and Virginia2 2 apparently are the only two
states where a judge on divorce "is given no authority to transfer
title to marital property" but may "grant a discretionary cash
award to the less pecunious spouse."' 23 Therefore, Head is persua-
sive authority under Virginia law.
115. Id. at 1268.
116. Id. at 1269.
117. Id. at 1271.
118. 759 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1985).
119. Id. at 1173.
120. Id. at 1174.
121. Id.
122. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
123. Head, 759 F.2d at 1174. Virginia is in accord with this statutory rule. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-107.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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Parental kidnapping immunity was discussed in United States
v. Boettcher,124 where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that immunity under the federal kidnapping statute125 in favor of a
parent kidnapping his or her own minor child extends to aiding
and abetting by the parent and to the parent's participation in a
conspiracy with others to kidnap the child. In Boettcher, a mother
hired two men to kidnap her daughter from the father in West
Virginia and return her to the mother's custody in Illinois. The
court held that the mother was immune from prosecution under
the statute, just as the father had been when he had previously
kidnapped the daughter from the mother.126
Two recent bankruptcy cases may also be of interest to the Vir-
ginia family law practitioner. In Sumy v. Schlossberg,127 a case
dealing with a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the court held that
to the extent a debtor and a non-filing spouse are indebted jointly,
property owned as tenants by the entirety could not be exempted
from an individual debtor's bankruptcy estate and the trustee
could therefore administer such property for the benefit of the
joint creditors. Although Maryland law was applied in order to de-
termine the extent of any available exemption,128 the court stated
that Virginia law and Maryland law in this area are "identical in
all relevant respects. 12 9
The second bankruptcy case is Tilley v. Jessee.130 Interpreting
section 523(A)(5) of the federal bankruptcy code, 131 the Tilley
court restated the prevailing view that a property settlement
"debt" is dischargeable in bankruptcy, while "alimony" or "sup-
port and maintenance" is not. Applying this rule, the district court
found that a "property interest" provision in a postnuptial agree-
124. 780 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1985).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1983).
126. Boettcher, 780 F.2d at 436-37.
127. 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 924-28.
129. Id. at 928-29.
130. No. 85-0255-A (W.D. Va. Abingdon Div. Sept. 10, 1985) (Williams, J.), reprinted in 7
VA. FAM. L. NEWS 17 (1985-86).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under 727 . . .of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-
(5) to a spouse [or] former spouse... for alimony to, maintenance for, or support
of such spouse . . . in connection with a . . .divorce decree, or property settle-
ment, but not to the extent that-
(b) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support,
unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
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ment between the wife and her debtor ex-husband 132 constituted
"alimony" or spousal support for bankruptcy purposes. 133
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision, holding that the court's characterization of the
property interest as alimony was clearly erroneous. 34 The circuit
court stated that a "mutual intent to create support obligation...
clearly remains the threshold that must be crossed before any
other concerns become relevant" in classifying a separation agree-
ment provision as alimony or a property settlement.135 The circuit
132. The relevant postnuptial agreement provision read as follows:
5. Property interest of Wife in Husband's property and estate. Husband will exe-
cute and deliver to Wife a note in the form of Exhibit 1 hereto payable to her order
in the principal amount of $125,000 with interest at the rate of 7% per annum, paya-
ble quarter-annually. Interest only shall be paid on this note during the 7-/2 years
after its date, and thereafter payments of principal and interest payable quarter-an-
nually. Interest only shall be made for a period of 7-/2 years so that at the end of
fifteen years after the date of the note, the entire principal and interest shall have
been paid. To secure the payment of this note, Husband shall assign a life insurance
policy or policies on his life aggregating $125,000. When payments of principal begin
on this note, then the portion of the life insurance policy or policies assigned as secur-
ity shall automatically recude [reduce] by the amount of such principal payment as
they are made.
133. Arthur E. Smith, Esquire, of Roanoke, who submitted this opinion, adds the follow-
ing analysis:
Judge Williams has relied primarily upon the testimony of the wife concerning how
she used the money paid to her on the note, i.e., for her support and maintenance;
but should have considered that the property settlement note continued to be paya-
ble upon the death of the husband or the death or remarriage of the wife.
It is well to note that Judge Williams . . . did not consider the life insurance as a
"security" to be a factor but it was noted that the insurance would pay only the
unpaid balance of the debt.
Another question arises since the United States District Court has declared the
property settlement "debt" not dischargeable and in reality alimony, is the Internal
Revenue Service bound by the decision since Tilley, upon advice of his accountants,
had deducted only the interest? [sic] Likewise, the wife had not paid income taxes on
the principal payments.
In spite of the fact that the property settlement agreement . . . required the wife
to execute special warranty deeds to her interest in the husband's real estate, both
titled in his name and jointly owned, lawyers in the case have told me that there was
no jointly-owned real estate. Accordingly, the only release of property could have
been that of inchoate dower. ...
In view of the monetary award rather than a division in kind which we have in our
statutes, it seems to me that this decision requires the practitioner to secure properly
the award or at least to insist that the court require proper security for any deferred
payments. Malpractice could certainly be charged if an award were in fact subse-
quently bankrupt and discharged. . ..
7 VA. FAM. L. NEWS 17, 17 (1985-86).
134. Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1078 (1986).
135. Id. at 1078 n.4.
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court found no evidence that the parties to the separation agree-
ment mutually intended an obligation different from the property
settlement obligation expressly stated in their written separation
agreement.136 Therefore, the husband's obligation was not in the
nature of alimony and was dischargeable in bankruptcy.13 7
136. Id. at 1078. In reaching its decision, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that
the document exhibited a structured drafting which dealt with the issues of alimony and
property settlement in totally distinct segments of the document. The court noted that "as
one member of this panel observed at oral argument, if this agreement does not reveal an
intent to separate alimony from a property settlement, it is virtually impossible to envision
a written agreement that could do so." Id.
137. Id. at 1075.
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APPENDIX A
Explanation of the "Income Shares" Concept*
The kind of standard for determining child support obligations
which this commission is recommending - the "income shares"
approach - has been developed for the U.S. Office of Child Sup-
port Enforcement by Robert G. Williams of the National Center
for State Courts.1 Such an approach is in effect now in the state of
Washington, has just been adopted for the state of New Jersey,
and is expected to be adopted for the state of Michigan at about
the time this report becomes public. The approach is also being
recommended currently by the child support commission of
Colorado.
Many of the developments in these several states - Washington is
the exception - were set in motion by federal legislation last year.
One of the requirements of the Child Support Amendments of
1984 is that each state have a commission to study that state's
child support system. It is noteworthy that so many of the states
now researching the issues have been attracted to the income
shares concept.
The central idea in the income shares approach is to make it possi-
ble for the child to receive the proportion of parental income which
the child would have received had the child's parents continued to
live together.
Is it possible to determine what American parents spend on their
children? It is, although the results will sometimes be surprising.
As Thomas Espenshade observes, "Current evidence suggests that
parents vastly underestimate the amount of money they spend on
their children. "2
One of the reasons for this underestimation of expenditure on chil-
dren is that, in an intact household, it is not possible directly to
observe all of the spending on children. Such spending, as Robert
Williams observes, "is commingled with spending on behalf of
* Excerpt from the Report of the Virginia Governor's Commission on Child Support; text
and notes are reprinted verbatim.
1. Williams, Development of Formulas for Establishing and Updating Child Support
Orders: Interim Report (1331 17th Street, Denver, Colorado 80202: Institute for Court Man-
agement of the National Center for State Courts, June 7, 1985), page 64-75.
2. Thomas J. Espenshade, Investing in Children: New Estimates of Parental Expendi-
tures (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), page xiii.
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adults for the largest expenditure categories (e.g., food, housing,
and transportation)."3
From a number of sophisticated studies which Williams analyzes
(including the 1984 study by Espenshade just cited), it appears
that in intact households of equal gross income American parents
tend to spend the same proportion of their income on their chil-
dren if they have the same number of children. There is a two fold
pattern here - a pattern which can be seen in Table 2 below:
1. The percent of American parents' income spent on their chil-
dren goes up as the number of their children goes up - which
means that the parents are spending a smaller and smaller per-
cent of their income on themselves;
2. The percent of American parents income spent on their chil-
dren goes down somewhat, for any given number of children,
as parental income rises - which does not necessarily mean,
however, that the parents are spending larger percentages of
their income on themselves.4
A hypothetical case will demonstrate how the income shares ap-
proach works. Start with an intact family with two children. The
father's gross income is $1,200 per month, and the mother's income
is $800, for a total family income of $2,000 per month. From Table
2, at this $2,000 per month gross income level, an American family
is spending approximately 25.1% of its gross income on these two
children, not counting child care or extraordinary medical ex-
penses. (See below).
When the parents separate, if the children are to have a material
standard of living similar to that which they had before the separa-
tion, the share of each parent's gross income devoted to these chil-
3. Williams, Development of Formulas, p. 64.
4. It is a mistake to say that, because wealthier parents are spending smaller fractions of
income on their children, they are spending larger fractions of income on themselves. Look-
ing only at spending for consumption, American parents of a given number of children
spend about the same fraction of their income on those children, no matter how wealthy
they are. (Williams, Development of Formulas, p. 65.) As income increases, wealthier people
devote smaller and smaller fractions of their income to consumption, whether for themselves
or for their children.
Thus, as income increases, the fraction of income spent on children is dropping because
nonconsumption use of income is going up. Nonconsumption use of income includes such
purposes as saving, investment and taxes. Sooner or later, most of this saving and invest-
ment goes to the children in the form of college education, weddings, loans, and finally,
through inheritance.
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dren is still going to be 25%. If the mother becomes the custodian,
she will of necessity be spending her share directly on the children.
(This is calculated as 25% of $800, or $200 per month.) The fa-
ther's share will be provided as child support payments. (They will
be 25% of $1,200, or $300 per month.)5
TABLE 2
Child Support as a Percent of Gross Income6
Yearly income: first two lines across
Monthly income: second two lines across
Number $ 0- $10,000- $15,000- $20,000- $25,000- $35,000- $50,000+
of $9,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 34,999 49,999
Chil- $0 - $834- $1250- $1667- $2083- $2917- $4167+
dren $833 1249 1666 2082 2916 4166
1 23.5% 19.5 17.5 16.1 15.2 14.2 11.6
2 36.5 30.3 27.2 25.1 23.5 22.1 17.9
3 45.7 38.0 34.1 31.4 29.5 27.7 22.4
4 51.5 42.9 38.4 35.4 33.3 31.2 25.3
5 56.2 46.7 41.9 38.6 36.3 34.1 27.5
6 60.1 49.9 44.8 41.3 38.8 36.4 29.4
(The percentages stated above exclude work related child care costs and
extraordinary medical and dental expenses. In-the income shares forumla,
these costs or expenses are divided between the parents in proportion to
income and added to the child support determined in the table.)
Work-related child care expenses is treated separately because
before the child support percentages were put into Table 2, they
were systqmatically lowered in a way based on the finding that
expenditures for work-related child care amount to 3.9% of con-
sumption in an average household where the wife works full or
part time.7 In the hypothetical case, the parents' incomes are in
the ratio of 60-40 ($1,200 to $800). Thus, if child care is necessary
for the mother to work, 60% of the cost is added to the father's
support payments. The mother pays the rest directly.
If the child has any extraordinary medical or dental expenses,
5. As is obvious, child support calculated in this way totals $500. This differs slightly
from the $494 child support which is shown in Table 1 in the main body of this report,
because the larger Table 1 has "smoothed out" the changing percentage obligations so that
they rise or fall gradually rather than "jumping" suddenly as one moves from one income
bracket to the next. As combined income rises, the percentage of child support obligation
slowly declines. Thus, since the hypothetical family's $2,000 income is at the very high end
of the $1,667-2,082 income bracket, the amount they spend on children is less than 25%.
6. This table is taken from Robert Williams, Development of Formulas, page 71, with a
few editorial modifications, but no change of substance.
7. Williams, Development of Forumlas, page 66.
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these hypothetical parents would pay those expenses on the same
60-40 basis as they do the child care.
A final word is needed concerning the relationship between the ta-
ble shown in this appendix and the larger table (Table 1) which is
found in the main body of this Commission's report. Table 2 in
this appendix is more useful in explaining the concept of income
shares than is Table 1. The Commission recommends that child
support amounts be taken from Table 1 because the percentages of
income on Table 2 "jump" suddenly as one moves from one income
bracket to the next. Thus, obligors with more income could owe
less in child support than obligors with less income.

